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ESSAY
Quasi-Constitutional Change Without
Intent—a Response to Richard Albert
REIJER PASSCHIER†
In response to Richard Albert’s Quasi-Constitutional Amendments,
65 BUFF. L. REV. 739 (2017).

INTRODUCTION
Today, almost every country in the world has a written
constitution that includes one or more procedures for
formally changing its text.1 Such “formal constitutional
amendment procedures” are often considered very
important, if not essential, elements of a modern
constitutional democratic system.2 Some people even seem to
believe that, in constitutional democracies where
constitutions are codified in a master constitutional text,
formal constitutional amendment is the exclusive way in
which constitutional norms change. For example, the United
States Supreme Court once noted that “nothing new can be
put into the Constitution except through the amendatory
process. Nothing old can be taken out without the same
process.”3
† Assistant Professor at Tilburg Law School. r.passchier@uvt.nl. I am grateful for
helpful comments provided by Maarten Stremler and Eva van Vugt.
1. See Comparative Constitutions Project, Constitution Amendment
Procedure,
CONSTITUTE
(Sept.
30,
2017,
8:27
AM),
https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en&key=amend.
2. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 461 (1993); VENICE
COMM’N, REPORT ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 3 (2009) [hereinafter Venice
Comm’n].
3. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1955).
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Formal constitutional amendment has indeed been an
important route for constitutional reform. The German Basic
Law, for example, has been amended approximately sixtythree times in the past sixty-eight years, and some of these
amendments have facilitated major constitutional
developments such as rearmament, emergency regulations,
budgetary
and
financial
policy
reorganisations,
4
reunification, and European integration. However, research
in the emerging field of comparative constitutional change
suggests that in reality, formal amendment is not the only—
and in some systems, not even the most common—way in
which constitutions change. Constitutions have also adjusted
over time through alternative processes of change, both legal
and non-legal.5
Actuated by this insight, it has become quite common in
comparative constitutional scholarship over the past decade
or so to distinguish between “formal constitutional
amendment” and “informal constitutional change.”6 The
concept of formal constitutional amendment usually refers to
explicit alterations in the wording of a master constitutional
text that have been engineered through the special
amendment procedure typically included in such texts.7 The
concept of informal constitutional change, by contrast, refers
to change in the operation of existing constitutional norms
that has come about without formal constitutional
amendment—that is, through other “alternative” processes

4. See WERNER HEUN, THE CONSTITUTION
ANALYSIS 9–23 (2011).

OF

GERMANY: A CONTEXTUAL

5. See generally Venice Comm’n, supra note 2, at 22; see STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 28 (1996); WALTER F.
MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING A JUST
POLITICAL ORDER 497–529 (2007).
6. See Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment
Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring
Amendment Difficulty, 13 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 686, 688 (2015).
7. See ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
55 (2009).
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of changing the constitution.8
One of the most challenging questions the phenomenon
of informal constitutional change raises is how this
phenomenon can be best understood.9 That is, how can we
best describe and explain constitutional change that occurs
outside formal amendment procedures? An additional
question raised is how best to identify this type of
constitutional change in the first place. These questions lie
at the heart of constitutional theory and practice because
they compel us to rethink our presuppositions about how the
realms of constitutional law and politics relate to one another
across time.10
A. Albert’s Basic Idea
In a fascinating and helpful article, Richard Albert
explores these questions by looking into what he refers to as
“quasi-constitutional amendments.”11 As Albert describes
this phenomenon:
A quasi-constitutional amendment is a sub-constitutional
alteration to the operation of a set of existing norms in the
constitution. It is a change that does not possess the same legal
status as a constitutional amendment, that is formally susceptible
to statutory repeal or revision, but that may achieve the function,
though not the formal status of constitutional law over time as a

8. Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical
Response to Our Undemocratic Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 925, 929 (2007);
HEINRICH AMADEUS WOLFF, UNGESCHRIEBENES VERFASSUNGSRECHT UNTER DEM
GRUNDGESETZ 99 (2000); Reijer Passchier, Informal Constitutional Change:
Constitutional Change Without Formal Constitutional Amendment in
Comparative Perspective (Sept. 28, 2017) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
Leiden University) (on file with author).
9. The difficulty of this challenge is for example recognized by Elkins et al.
and Hesse. See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 7, at 46; KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZÜGE
DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 15 (20th ed. 1995).
10. See MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 297–311 (2010); see
generally CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: BRIDGING IDEALISM AND
REALISM 94–101 (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2017).
11. Richard Albert, Quasi-Constitutional Amendments, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 739,
739–740 (2017).
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result of its subject-matter and importance—making it just as
durable as a constitutional amendment.12

Albert then suggests that, in identifying quasiconstitutional amendments, we should focus on what he
believes to be their “one common point of origin.”13 As he
writes:
As to their origins, quasi-constitutional amendments are the result
of a self-conscious circumvention of onerous rules of formal
amendment in order to alter the operation of a set of existing norms
in the constitution . . . Where constitutional actors determine,
correctly or not, that the current political landscape would frustrate
their plans for a constitutional amendment to entrench new policy
preferences, they resort instead to sub-constitutional means—for
instance, legislation or political practice—whose success requires
less or perhaps even no cross-party and inter-institutional
coordination.14

B. My Response
I fully agree with Albert that quasi-constitutional
amendments—which I will consider a species of the broader
phenomenon of informal constitutional change—exist and
that it is imperative that we pay more attention to this type
constitutional development. I also find Albert’s definition
particularly helpful as it acknowledges changes in the
working of a constitution may take place not only at
particular
“moments,”15
but
also
gradually
and
incrementally.16 As Heller already knew, “a power which,
while for a time existing as a matter of brute fact, and though
experienced as unjust, succeeds in winning for itself bit by
bit the belief in its justification.”17 Albert’s definition of
12. Id. at 740.
13. Id. at 741.
14. Id. at 742.
15. For a discussion a theory of constitutional “moments,” see 1 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 6–7, 40–41, 266 (1993).
16. Albert, supra note 11, at 740.
17. Hermann Heller, The Nature and Function of the State, 18 CARDOZO L.
REV .1139, 1180 (1996).

2017]

CHANGE WITHOUT INTENT

1081

quasi-constitutional amendments accounts for this oftenneglected fact.
However, I also have a more skeptical set of comments
on Albert’s article which I will set out in this essay. To
provide a preview: the central point I will make concerns
Albert’s insistence on quasi-constitutional amendments
being the result of a “self-conscious” effort to circumvent
“onerous rules of formal amendment in order to alter the
operation of a set of existing norms in the constitution.”18 As
I will argue in this Essay, a truly comprehensive theory of
quasi-constitutional
amendments—or
of
informal
constitutional change—is also able to account for
constitutional change caused by facts not accompanied by a
demonstrable intent or awareness of the change on the part
of constitutional actors. Recognizing such change, which I
will refer to as “silent constitutional change,” has
implications for the way we should describe processes of
constitutional development and explain why constitutional
change does not always come about through the “front door”
of a formal constitutional amendment procedure.
C. Two Preliminary Remarks
Before I start, I would like to make two remarks about
the phrase “quasi-constitutional amendments.” First, I like
the prefix “quasi,” because it appreciates the fact that
changes in non-constitutional form can have profound
implications for the operation of existing constitutional
norms (indeed, almost as profound as the ‘real’ thing, which
is a formal constitutional amendment), but also that such
changes cannot, in principle, perfectly substitute formal
constitutional amendments. Indeed, it is important to
account for the more or less obvious, yet sometimes
neglected, fact that processes taking place outside of a formal
constitutional amendment procedure can profoundly change
the operation of a constitution, but not its text.19 This implies
18. Albert, supra note 11, at 741–42.
19. See Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitutional
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that, however consequential informal processes can be for
the working of constitutional texts, we should anticipate that
in any given master-text constitutional democracy it is
possible that some “hard-wired” constitutional issues can
change only through formal constitutional amendment.20
Moreover, the fact that informal processes of change cannot
affect the literal wording of the constitutional text entails
that it is wise for students of constitutional development to
presuppose that the changes these processes have produced
might not always be capable of perfectly substituting formal
constitutional amendments in being the final arbiter of
disputes and controversies that may arise in the course of
constitutional development.21 As Gerken puts it, “[i]f
amendment takes place informally and is not embodied in an
agreed-upon textual reference, how do we figure out the
difference between an enduring shift in constitutional
meaning and the product of ordinary politics?”22
However, I object to use of the word “amendment” in the
phrase “quasi-constitutional amendments.”23 In many
jurisdictions, the word “amendment” has a very specific
meaning—its use is reserved for textual modifications of
legislation, both ordinary and constitutional. For example,
the United States Constitution was amended for the last
time in 1992, when the constitutional legislator brought
about the twenty-seventh textual addition to the 1789
constitutional document.24 The word “change” commonly has
a broader meaning—it can be used to refer to alterations in
the operation of existing norms in legislation regardless of
Amendments: A Response to David Strauss, 77 TUL. L. REV. 247, 248 (2002).
20. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 29 (2006);
Wim J.M. Voermans, Constitutional Reserves and Covert Constitutions, 3 INDIAN
J. CONST. L. 84, 84 (2009).
21. WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON, FEDERALISM
(1956).

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 14

22. Gerken, supra note 8, at 937–38.
23. I thank my colleague Eva van Vugt for suggesting this point.
24. U.S. CONST. amend XXVII.
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the form in which these alterations have come about. I will
therefore use the phrase “quasi-constitutional change”
instead of the phrase “quasi-constitutional amendment” to
refer to sub-constitutional alterations to the operation of
existing constitutional norms.
At the outset, I stress that my response to Albert’s article
should serve to caution us that when we benefit from Albert’s
ideas to make sense of constitutional change, we should keep
in the back of our minds that the perspective Albert takes
does not provide a comprehensive view on constitutional
change and that at least one powerful alternative perspective
is indeed available. Albert’s analysis of issues regarding
constitutional change is razor-sharp and the concepts he
develops are very helpful, especially for comparative
purposes. Moreover, Albert’s ideas shed new light on
classical problems of constitutionalism and their
implications deserve sustained scholarly attention.
I. SILENT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
As we have seen, in Albert’s view, the origins of quasiconstitutional change lie in a self-conscious effort of
constitutional actors to circumvent rules of formal
constitutional amendment in order to alter the operation of
a set of existing norms in the constitution.25 Taking this
perspective on constitutional change has at least one major
advantage: it allows us to appreciate important methods of
changing the constitution outside the conventional canon of
formal constitutional amendments and “landmark” judicial
decisions while more or less maintaining a relatively ordered
worldview in which a nation’s constitution is seen as a closed
legal system whose development is controlled by the
community of constitutional actors that lives within it.26 The

25. Albert, supra note 11, at 741–42.
26. See
Christoph
Möllers,
Pouvoir
Constituant-ConstitutionConstitutionalisation in PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 183, 187–
88 (Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds., 2006).
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main problem of quasi-constitutional change is that,
according to Albert, it complicates “our understanding of how
a constitution is made, what it is, and where to find it.”27
However, if we limit ourselves, as Albert does, to recognizing
change that is engineered intentionally by constitutional
actors, we should be able to account for some alternative
constitutional law-making paths that are currently
underappreciated and, at the same time, preserve a
relatively clear epistemological and methodological
distinction between the normative “ought” of constitutional
law—whether purposefully changed by constitutional actors
or not—and describing the empirical “is” of socio-political
development.28
On the other hand, the approach Albert takes is not
without its limitations. Most importantly, due to its “residual
legal positivism”29—as Loughlin would presumably refer to
Albert’s attempt to save the autonomy and specific
normativity of constitutional law—Albert’s approach does
not enable us to account for informal or quasi-constitutional
change whose causes cannot be traced to self-conscious
efforts to evade hard-to-pass formal constitutional
amendment routes. I call the phenomenon to which I am
alluding silent constitutional change.30 Silent constitutional
change is an alteration in the operation of existing
constitutional norms that takes place without foregoing
formal constitutional amendment, and is caused by facts that

27. Albert, supra note 11, at 765.
28. For defenses of a “strict” distinction between “is” and “ought,” see Hans
Kelsen, On the Border Between Legal and Sociological Method, in WEIMAR: A
JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS 57, 58 (Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernard Schlink eds.,
2000); Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 145, 146–147 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995); Ernst Wolfgang
Böckenförde, Anmerkungen zum Begriff Verfassungswandel, in WEGE UND
VERFAHREN DES VERFASSUNGSLEBENS 6, 6 (Peter Badura et al. eds., 1993).
29. LOUGHLIN, supra note 10, at 303.
30. This phrase references the German term “stiller Verfassungswandel.” See
e.g. HEUN, supra note 4, at 21; Möllers, supra note 26, at 190.
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are not accompanied by a demonstrable intention or
awareness of the change on the part of constitutional
actors.31 Indeed, the “classic” German constitutionalist
Georg Jellinek already noted that a theory of constitutional
change which incorporates silent constitutional change is
much more interesting than one which only appreciates
change that comes about through purposeful acts of will.32
We can distinguish between at least two types of silent
constitutional change theories. Informal and quasiconstitutional change should arguably be capable of
accounting for: 1) silent constitutional change that occurs—
more or less—within the control of constitutional actors; and
2) silent constitutional change that occurs outside of these
actors’ control. I hasten to add, however, that this typology
serves an explanatory purpose. “Controlled” and
“uncontrolled” silent constitutional change may not occur in
their pure form in the real world. Moreover, as we shall see,
the two categories may overlap: change that was initially
inside the scope of control of constitutional actors may, over
time, get out of hand.
A. Controlled Change
Consider first the possibility of silent constitutional
change occurring within the control of constitutional actors.
In this scenario, constitutional change is triggered by acts of
constitutional actors without these actors univocally
revealing—or explicitly acknowledging—an intention to
bypass formal constitutional amendment hurdles in order to
alter the operation of existing constitutional norms. Even
where we have ample reason to suspect constitutional actors
of deliberately trying to circumvent such hurdles, these

31. GEORG JELLINEK, VERFASSUNGSÄNDERUNG UND VERFASSUNGSWANDLUNG 3
(1906) [hereinafter Verfassungsänderung], translated in Georg Jellinek,
Constitutional Amendment and Constitutional Transformation, in Jacobson &
Schlink, supra note 28, at 54–57.
32. Verfassungsänderung, supra note 31, at 3.
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actors may not always admit—or indeed, even deny—that
they have an objective to change the constitution or that they
think that constitutional change is going on. As Wolff
reminds us, informal constitutional change does not
necessarily bear the character of open renewal; it may well
come about without a clear separation being made between
what has hitherto been said, and what now applies.33
Additionally, the results of efforts to change constitutional
norms outside cumbersome processes of new constitutional
writing are occasionally claimed to be timelessly correct.34
An example of the type of silent constitutional
development imagined here can arguably be found in
American constitutionalism. The United States Constitution
vests in Congress the power to “declare war” and it makes
the president the “Commander in Chief” of the Armed
Forces.35 Regardless of their exact original meaning (which
is contested), these provisions have made sure that, roughly
up and until the Second World War, the ability of presidents
to use military force depended to a great extent on
congressional consent.36 In short, the clause permitting
Congress to declare war protected a prerogative for Congress
to authorize and regulate the use of military force. The
Commander-in-Chief clause protected nothing more—and
nothing less—than a presidential prerogative to superintend
the military; that is, to execute the use of force in accordance
with the wishes of Congress.37
However, during the Cold War and the War on Terror, a
development occurred whereby the president, as
33. WOLFF, supra note 8, at 99.
34. Id.
35. See U.S. CONST. art I § 8; Id. art. II, § 2.
36. Stephen M. Griffin, The Executive Power, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 343, 351–53 (Mark Tushnet et al., eds. 2015).

OF

37. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The War Power, 33 HARV. J. L. SOC. POL’Y 113,
115–16, 124–26 (2010); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander
In Chief at The Lowest Ebb: Framing The Problem, Doctrine, And Original
Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 691, 767–800 (2008).
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Commander-in-Chief, acquired an ever more powerful and
independent position in the field of national security.38
Although this development deviates significantly from the
traditional pre-WWII understanding of the division of
constitutional war powers, the judiciary has hardly
interfered; it has consistently refused to hear the merits in
cases concerning the allocation and use of war powers.39 The
result is that a contemporary American president, as
Commander-in-Chief, can hardly be controlled by Congress.
As a practical matter at least, a contemporary president has
a broad, preclusive, and unilateral authority to deploy
conventional weapons and intelligence units, and use
nuclear arms.40
An important, if not the primary, driver of this
development has been successive post-WWII presidents
asserting autonomous power to commence and wage largescale military conflicts.41 However, in asserting such a
power, presidents hardly, if ever, explicitly acknowledged
that they had an intention to change the operation of the U.S.
constitutional war clauses or show an awareness that their
moves had profound constitutional implications. They simply
claim that their broad claims to the war powers were in
accordance with the plan of the U.S. Constitution as it
always had been interpreted and, hence, that their claims
did not amount to constitutional change at all.
Take, for example, the moves President Truman made
before and during the Korean War. When Truman deployed
troops in Korea in 1950, he became the first president to
commence a large-scale military conflict without

38. See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND
Barron & Lederman, supra note 37, at 944–45.

THE

CONSTITUTION 1 (2013);

39. LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 302 (3d ed. 2013).
40. Paulsen, supra note 37, at 122; Barron & Lederman, supra note 37, at
1056–58.
41. Barron & Lederman, supra note 37, at 1055–58.
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congressional approval.42 When confronted with critique
from Congress, Truman boldly claimed—without reference
to the existing division of constitutional war powers—that
“[u]nder the President’s constitutional powers as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces he has the
authority to send troops anywhere in the world. That power
has been recognized repeatedly by the Congress and the
courts.”43 Truman may or may not have intended to change
the U.S. Constitution’s scheme for war. He may or may not
have been aware of the constitutional consequences his
actions could have; but, in any case, he created a precedent
which would have profound and durable implications for the
way the U.S. Constitution’s war clauses would operate in the
decades to follow.44
Indeed, other post-WWII presidents have followed
Truman’s lead. When, after the Vietnam War, Congress
adopted the War Powers Resolution (WPR),45 which can be
understood as an effort to re-circumscribe the president’s
Commander-in-Chief powers,46 Nixon argued that the WPR
was “CLEARLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL” [sic], because it
was an “attempt to take away, by mere legislative act,
authorities which the President has properly exercised under
the Constitution for almost 200 years.”47 Here, a president
explicitly denied the existence of an incongruence between
the way the U.S. Constitution’s war clauses had operated
traditionally, and the way things had evolved in the decades

42. Id., at 1055. GRIFFIN, supra note 5, at 32.
43. The President’s News Conference of January 11, 1951, 1951 PUB. PAPERS
17, 19, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14050.
44. GRIFFIN, supra note 38, at 3–4; MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE
POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 18, 92 (2013); Barron & Lederman,
supra note 37, at 1055–56.
45. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
46. See id. § 2.
47. Veto of the War Powers Resolution, 1973 PUB. PAPERS 893, 893 (OCT. 24,
1973), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4021.
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after the Second World War.48 Nixon even added a little extra
by claiming that it was Congress that sought to alter the
constitution by the use of improper means.49 Saliently, to his
veto of the WPR, he added that the “only way in which the
constitutional powers of a branch of the Government can be
altered is by amending the Constitution—and any attempt
to make such alterations by legislation alone is clearly
without force.”50
Of course, it is possible that Nixon was not really aware
of the fact that his moves could trigger further constitutional
change, or at least make the informal (or quasi-)
constitutional changes that already occurred more durable,
although his statements do not reveal such a consciousness.
As for the question of whether constitutional change
occurred, it does not really matter what Nixon thought and
knew. Accompanied or not by an intention or awareness of
constitutional change, the consequences of Nixon’s moves for
the operation of the U.S. Constitution would be profound and
more or less permanent.51
B. Uncontrolled Change
Turn now to the possibility of sub-constitutional
developments affecting the operation of existing
constitutional norms lying beyond the direct control of
constitutional actors. When constitutional actors engineer
certain non-constitutional changes, they may not always be
aware that what they are doing may actually have
constitutional consequences. Furthermore, an action that
seems merely “ordinary” at the time it occurs may
significantly alter the operation of existing constitutional
norms in the future. As Fusaro and Oliver remind us,
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. FISHER, supra note 39, at 144–45; Barron & Lederman, supra note 37, at
1064–1112.
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constitutional changes are not necessarily “the product of the
will of the legitimate authorities in the pursuit of a relatively
transparent institutional strategy.”52 Additionally, the
operation of constitutional norms may change as a
consequence of “evolutionary” or “contextual” forces; that is,
legal or non-legal forces not unleashed by constitutional
actors at all.53 After all, constitutions do not operate in a
vacuum, but they are, as Jellinek puts it, by inescapable
necessity placed in the flow of historic events.54
One example of this type of silent constitutional change
can be found in the constitutional orders of Member States
of the European Union (EU). Especially in the founding
Member States of the EU,55 the evolution of European
integration has caused profound and durable change in the
operation of national constitutional norms that has not been
accompanied, at least not initially, by an intention or
awareness of such change on the part of national
constitutional actors.56 Remember that back in the 1950’s
and 1960’s, the European Community (the predecessor of the
contemporary EU),57 was created by an “ordinary”

52. Carlo Fusaro & Dawn Oliver, Towards a Theory of Constitutional Change,
in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE : A COMPARATIVE STUDY 405, 407 (Dawn Oliver &
Carlo Fusaro eds., 2011).
53. Id; REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS & THOMAS WÜRTENBERGER,
STAATSRECHT 64 (31st ed., 2005).

DEUTSCHES

54. JELLINEK, supra note 31, at 2.
55. Of course, states that entered the Union later were indeed aware of at
least some of the constitutional consequences their membership would have,
depending on their moment of entry.
56. Depending on whether or not one recognizes the supremacy of EU law
above national constitutional law, this is an example either of sub-constitutional
change in the operation of existing constitutional norms, and hence “quasiconstitutional change”, as defined by Albert, or supra-constitutional change in
the operation of existing constitutional norms, a phenomenon which we may
understand as yet another species of the broader phenomenon of informal
constitutional change.
57. In this part, I use the term “European Union” to refer to the current Union
as well as the various Communities that have preceded this organization. This
approach is consistent with Article 1(3) of the Treaty of the European Union,
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international treaty—just as were other international
organizations.58 National constitutional actors who ratified
this treaty neither meant to alter the operation of their
national constitution, nor fathomed what kind of
constitutional consequences their actions would have in
time.59 Nevertheless, European legal scholars soon
recognized that the development of the ratification of this
treaty set in motion implied substantial “material”
modifications to the contents of national constitutions.60
The basis of this effect was laid down by a power barely
controlled by national constitutional actors: the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In its famous 1964
decision Costa V. ENEL, this court held that that EU laws
enjoy supremacy over national law, including national
constitutional law,61 and that citizens may invoke this
supremacy before the national courts of the Member
States.62 The court reasoned that “[b]y contrast with
ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created
its own legal system, which on the entry into force of the
Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the
Member States, and one that their courts are bound to
apply.”63
As a consequence, national constitutional norms would
no longer be applicable if they conflicted with EU law, and in

which states that ‘The Union shall replace and succeed the European EU.”
ROBERT SCHÜTZE, EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW lxvi (2016).
58. Treaty instituting the European Coal and Steel Community No. 3729,
Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, 140–51.
59. Dieter S. Grimm, The Basic Law at 60 – Identity and Change, 11 GER. L.
J. 33, 44 (2010).
60. Ignolf Pernice, Constitutional Law Implications for a State Participating
in a Process of Regional Integration, German Constitution and “Multilevel
Constitutionalism,” GER. REPORTS PUB. L.. 40, 42 (1998).
61. The court explicitly confirmed this in Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle
Finanze v. Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978 E.C.R. 629.
62. Case C-6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593–94.
63. Id. at 593.
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case of doubt, national constitutional norms had to be
interpreted in light of EU legislation.64 National
constitutions remained relevant insofar as they addressed
subjects not regulated at the European level.65 As the scope
of EU law would gradually widen, national constitutional
norms lost importance.66
True, after the first steps were made, subsequent
progress in European integration was achieved partly by
self-conscious (sub-constitutional) acts on the part of
national constitutional actors. Concluding and ratifying new
treaties are one example. In that sense, informal
constitutional change by European integration has, at least
partly, deliberately been affected, and indeed controlled, by
national constitutional actors. On the other hand, perhaps
the greater part of progress in the evolution of European
integration has been achieved at the European level itself.
For example, through the decisions of the CJEU,67 the
enactment of secondary European law,68 and through the
formation of constitutional conventions.69 These changes
may or may not have been effected self-consciously by EU
legal actors; national constitutional actors were often not
involved.70 As Woelk explains, with reference to the German
context, although national constitutional actors appeared
initially to maintain at least some control over change taking

64. HARMUT MAURER, STAATSRECHT I 128 (5th ed. 2007).
65. Grimm, supra note 59, at 45.
66. Id.
67. DEIRDRE CURTIN, EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: LAW,
PRACTICES AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 179 (2009).
68. Grimm, supra note 59, at 45.
69. See generally Thomas Beukers, Law, Practice and Convention in the
Constitution of the European Union 2011 (PhD Thesis, University of Amsterdam
(on file with the Library of the University of Amsterdam); see CURTIN, supra note
67, at 278; accord Isabella Eiselt & Peter Slominski, Sub-Constitutional
Engineering: Negotiation, Content, and Legal Value of Interinstitutional
Agreements in the EU, 12 EUR. L. J. 209, 209–225 (2006).
70. Voermans, supra note 20, at 97–103.
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place at the European level, the “incremental” evolution of
European integration in quantitative and qualitative terms
soon raised the problem of what he refers to as “silent
constitutional revision.’’71
Consider the following examples of how the evolution of
European integration has affected national constitutional
norms silently.72 First, the evolution of European integration
has effectively compelled national courts to increasingly
function as EU courts as well. Indeed, it is the classic
constitutional task of national courts to interpret and apply
national and international law in accordance with the
national constitution.73 However, in Simmenthal, the CJEU
clearly stated that in the EU, “every national court must, in
a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its
entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on
individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of
national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or
subsequent to the Community rule.”74
Moreover, the evolution of EU integration has also
significantly changed the powers and role of national
parliaments.75 Following the Single European Act of 1987,
which allowed a majority vote in some European legislative
areas, this process increasingly reduced the ability of
national parliaments to make legislation unilaterally.76 The

71. Jens Woelk, Germany, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE:
(Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro eds.,2011).
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72. For additional examples, see Pernice, supra note 60; Ingolf Pernice, The
Treaty of Lisbon Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 349,
349–407 (2009).
73. See [GG] [BASIC LAW] arts. 92–104, translation at https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.pdf.
74. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze v. Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978
E.C.R. 629, 644.
75. See DIETER S. GRIMM, DIE ZUKUNFT DER VERFASSUNG II: AUSWIRKUNGEN
EUROPÄISIERUNG UND GLOBALISIERUNG II 107 (2012); HEUN, supra note 4, at
117.
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76. Grimm, supra note 59, at 45.
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wider the scope of EU law becomes, the less room remains
for the national parliaments to make their decisions
independently. Pernice argues that, as far as the
transposition of EU directives is concerned, the role of
national parliaments has become one of “rubber-stamping
the ideas from Brussels and acting as an administrative
agency rather than a political body.”77
In summary, it appears that important quasi- and other
informal constitutional changes in some constitutional
democracies have taken place without a demonstrable
intention or awareness of the change on the part of
constitutional actors. Albert’s perspective on quasiconstitutional change does not enable us to account for this
type of constitutional development. By holding on to the
legal-positivist idea that constitutional change is something
that, by definition, originates in “self-conscious” efforts of
constitutional actors,78 Albert neglects the fact that where
constitutional actors, deliberately or otherwise, do not
explicitly acknowledge or deny that their moves have called
into question the meaning of existing constitutional norms,
these moves can nevertheless have profound and durable
constitutional consequences. Moreover, Albert’s perspective
disregards the possibility of constitutional change being the
effect of historical developments outside the direct control of
constitutional actors.
Albert suggests that the idea of quasi-constitutional
change complicates our understanding of how constitutions
are made.79 Conversely, I would assert that if we maintain
that constitutions are always “made,” that is, that they are
necessarily the product of a purposeful act of will, we cannot
accurately understand how informal constitutional change
takes place and how we can best identify it.

77. Pernice, supra note 60, at 59.
78. Albert, supra note 11, at 741.
79. Id. at 765.
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II. A HISTORICAL-INSTITUTIONALISM VIEW
My critique on Albert’s approach to quasi-constitutional
change raises the following question: how instead should we
describe and explain the processes of informal constitutional
change, including quasi-constitutional change? I would
suggest adopting what Hirschl has coined a “historicalinstitutionalism” view.80 The way I see it, this crossdisciplinary view draws upon the proposition that, in
generating meaning, constitutional norms and the
institutional context in which these norms are embedded are
interconnected through time.81 In other words, the historicalinstitutionalism perspective rests upon the idea that a
nation’s constitutional norms and the actual stable, valued,
and recurring practices and understandings of its leading
constitutional authorities,82 form a single system—a
“constitutional order”83—that is composed of the dynamic
interplay between the “ought” of legal norms embodied by
the constitution and the “is” of institutional reality that
forms the context in which these norms operate.
On one hand, the historical-institutionalism view relies
on the claim that the operation of existing constitutional
norms may have a certain firmness of authority—that is, the
fact that they are written may shield them to a certain extent
from evolving constantly as their context evolves. On the
other hand, the historical-institutionalism view presupposes
that evolving institutional understandings and practices—

80. RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158 (2014).
81. See WiLLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION xiii (1993);
LOUGHLIN, supra note 10, at 310–11.
82. Which I understand as the major, permanent, empirical centers from
which constitutional authority is being exerted—such as the executive, legislator,
judiciary and public. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION:THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 333 (2012);
JOHANNES VAN DER HOEVEN, DE PLAATS VAN DE GRONDWET IN HET
CONSTITUTIONELE RECHT 32 (1958).
83. MURPHY, supra note 5, at 13.
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whatever legal or non-legal form they take (and whether or
not they are consciously engineered by constitutional
actors)—may also have normative implications for the
operation of existing constitutional norms. Thus, in contrast
to Albert’s more harmonious view on the “marriage” between
law and politics, I suggest to understand constitutional
change, in accordance with the historical institutionalism
view, as the result of a “tension,”84 or indeed “conflict,”85 or
“disharmony,”86 between constitutional norms and an
institutional reality that has become incongruent with these
norms.
The following question remains: if we accept that
informal
constitutional
change,
including
quasiconstitutional change, can also take place outside the will
and awareness of constitutional actors, how we can identify
such change? Focusing on self-conscious efforts to
circumvent onerous formal constitutional amendment rules
will, at the most, provide us a partial account of a nation’s
constitutional development. I would, therefore, suggest
identifying informal constitutional change by focusing on the
historical development of the “institutional constitution”—
the norms embodied by a nation’s master constitutional text
in relation to the institutional context in which these norms
are embedded.87 In my view, identifying constitutional
change then becomes a matter of studying changes in
practices and understandings of leading constitutional
authorities in relation to existing constitutional norms and
see, partly by analogy with detecting the formation of
constitutional conventions,88 whether these changes have:
84. See LOUGHLIN, supra note 10, at 232.
85. Stephen M. Griffin, Understanding Informal Constitutional Change, 19
(Tulane Univ. Sch. Of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 16-1.,
January 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2724580.
86. See GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 1–33 (2009).
87. See AMAR, supra note 82, at 335.
88. See NICK W. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 83 (Martin Loughlin et
al. eds., 2010).
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(1) concerned subjects addressed by the constitution; (2) been
persistent, that is, had staying power; (3) become standards
regarded binding by those whom they concern; and (4) been
accepted—implicitly or explicitly—as valid by a proportion at
least of the constitutional community.
Admittedly, my focus on historical interplay between the
interconnected realms of constitutional law and political
institutions only allows us to identify constitutional change
in retrospect. Here, as the great German philosopher G.W.F.
Hegel put it, “[t]he owl of Minerva spreads its wings only
with the falling of the dusk.”89 At the same time, however, it
appears that only a historical view can enable us to provide
accurate descriptions of how constitutional change takes
place and why it takes, or does not take, certain forms.
Furthermore, the historical-institutionalism perspective I
propose has at least one major advantage over Albert’s
‘broad’ legal-positivism approach: it allows us to also account
for sources of changing the constitution unaccompanied by a
demonstrable intent or awareness by constitutional actors of
change. Furthermore, this perspective maintains the idea
that constitutional law can have a special normativity—that
is, a certain firmness of authority and impact on how things
evolve in the real-world.
CONCLUSION
In this essay, I highlighted the value of Albert’s concept
of quasi-constitutional amendments and argued that his
approach has at least one important limitation: it only
enables us to account for one—and perhaps not even the
most important—type of informal constitutional change.
Albert suggests that we should identify informal
constitutional change by focusing on self-conscious efforts of
constitutional actors to circumvent the formal rules of

89. GEORG W.F. HEGEL, GRUNDLINIEN
ed., 1995).
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changing the constitution.90 I have argued, instead, that in
identifying informal constitutional change we should focus
on the interplay between existing constitutional norms and
institutional understandings and practices that form the
context of these norms. In that way, we may be able to also
account for the important phenomenon of “silent” informal
constitutional change—that is, constitutional change that
takes place without new writing and without a provable
awareness or intention on the part of constitutional actors
that constitutional change is going on.
The insights that constitutional change is not always
self-consciously “brought about,” or even accompanied, by an
awareness of change has important consequences for how
research in the field of comparative constitutional change
should be conducted. In this Essay, I have suggested some
ideas with regard to how we should identify constitutional
change. However, accepting that the import of constitutional
norms may change in unanticipated ways, or even outside
constitutional actors’ control, also has implications for the
way we should explore why constitutional developments
which do not always show on the face of the master
constitutional text. To suggest one hypothesis, this may not
only be a consequence of difficult formal constitutional lawmaking tracks, as Albert suggests,91 but also for example
with an unwillingness on the part of the constitutional
legislator to update the constitutional text when
constitutional change has already taken place in some other
form.
Moreover, recognizing that in the “marriage,” as Albert
calls it,92 between constitutional law and politics, law may be
less influential, arguably incurring consequences for the way
we should evaluate the implications of informal
constitutional change. Of course, constitutional change that
90. Albert, supra note 11, at 141–42.
91. Id. at 739.
92. Id.
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occurs outside of formal constitutional amendment
procedures might ultimately undermine the integrity of the
master constitutional document, as Albert suggests.93
However, we should not fail to consider that the phenomenon
of informal constitutional change, and in particular silent
constitutional change, also teaches us something about the
nature of law itself—namely that law may not only shape the
evolution of institutional reality, but that, in its turn, the
evolution of reality may also shape and reshape the meaning
of legal rules. Indeed, it confronts us with the fact that law
and reality have an interdependent relationship, and hence
that the capability of constitutional precepts to control the
distribution and exercise of power within a state is limited.94
This also reminds us that no constitution can preclude that
the operation of its provisions changes as a consequence of
developments that lay beyond the control of its constitutional
actors.95

93. Id. at 740.
94. Though not necessarily absent, as Jellinek concluded. See JELLINEK, supra
note 31, at 32.
95. See Brun-Otto Bryde, Änderung des Grundgesetzes, in GRUNDGESETZKOMMENTAR (Boysen et al. eds., 2012).

